would do justice to the moral claim of all of those who can only secure their most fundamental human rights by immigrating to another country. 11 Unfortunately, legal reform in the refugee protection regime seems unlikely due to the lack of motivation on the part of refugee receiving states. 12 Moreover, abandoning the current Convention presents great danger to the plight of refugees.
There is strong agreement among scholars and practitioners that if states attempted to negotiate a new Convention in the current political environment, they would adopt an even weaker set of legal norms, one that would leave even more vulnerable people outside its scope. Scholar Joan Fitzpatrick explains: " [t] he reluctance of the international community to abandon the 1951 foundation reflects not only a sense that the Convention embodies indispensible and enduring values, but also a pragmatic awareness that hoped for advances might instead dilute standards of protection."
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Philosopher Michael Dummett adds that, "any suggestion of renegotiating the Convention is dangerous: there are many signatory states that now consider its terms too generous." 14 On the face of it, legal change in the current refugee protection regime is at best infeasible and at worse perilous.
Given such stark tension between what is morally desirable and what is
currently attainable, it is not surprising that philosophers have kept their discussion at the theoretical level and have not advocated meaningful legal reform in this area. But this reluctance seems to some degree complacent. If we have strong reasons to believe that the current refugee protection regime is flawed, then surely we must think hard about how we might fix it. Simply pointing out the gaps in the Convention will not do justice to all the vulnerable people who currently are (or soon will be) in urgent need of international protection. But equally, naively pushing for legal reform may lead to a situation where even more desperate people are left without proper assistance. We are then left with a dilemma: long-term and robust change will only take place if states sign on to a new Convention, and yet if states do attempt to negotiate a new 11 I assume (without argument) that human rights are international legal devices that aim to secure important human interests. In this essay, I refer to fundamental human rights as those rights that track the most basic and non-negotiable human interests. This means of course that the list of human rights I am appealing to will not coincide with the broader list of the United Nations Human Rights Declaration, where, for instance, the right for paid holiday is considered a basic human right. 12 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 'Asylum: The Law and Politics of Change', International Journal of Refugee Law, 7:1 (1995) , p. 11. 13 Joan Fitzpatrick, 'Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention ', Harvard Human Rights Journal, 9 (1996) , p. 234, emphasis mine. See also, Betts, 'Survival Migration', pp. 377-378. 14 Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 37. this the feasibility dilemma of a new refugee protection regime.
In this essay, I attempt to show that this feasibility dilemma is only apparent.
My claim is that we can actually pursue reform in a way that does not risk losing what the international community has already achieved. But in order to do so, we must first alleviate the key constraints that make legal progress currently unattainable. More specifically, I argue that we must first deal with motivational and institutional constraints that currently obstruct progress in the area of refugee protection. Only then, can the international community embark on the road to legal reform.
This remainder of this essay is structured as follows: In part II, I discuss what sort of legal reform is needed if we are to do justice to the moral claims of the most vulnerable members of the international community. In part III, I argue that the feasibility dilemma I have presented earlier is only an illusion because the motivational and institutional constraints that hinder progress in this area can be substantially alleviated or transformed. In Part IV, I offer a feasible proposal that is likely to alleviate the constraints in question, rendering the international community more likely to sign up to a more robust Convention in the future. In part V, I address a key objection to my argument and conclude.
Part II
We have seen in the previous section that the 1951 Convention no longer provides (if it ever did) the international community with the conceptual and normative tools it needs to secure robust protection of vulnerable individuals. While the specification of who counts as a refugee is problematic because it is under-inclusive, the specification of how states should assist refugees is slightly disingenuous since it does not accept that refugees actually have a positive right to immigrate, and start a new life in another country (as I mentioned earlier, non-refoulement entails only a right not to be returned to the place of persecution). While I do not intend to expose all the shortcomings of the current Convention, I do want to defend the idea that it falls short of meeting three important desiderata. And in so doing, I aim to strengthen the case for eventual legal reform in the area of refugee protection.
So what are the desiderata that a new Refugee Convention must meet? It seems to me that a new Convention must at the very least meet the following three desiderata: D1. its specification of who qualifies for protection must be appropriately inclusive, D2. its assignment of legal responsibility to states must track their prior moral responsibility, and finally, D3. its text must give some guidance on how migration sits with other moral responsibilities enjoyed by recipient states. Let me take each of these desiderata in turn.
The first, and arguably most important, desideratum is that the specification of who counts as a refugee be appropriately inclusive. This means that it should acknowledge the different ways in which citizens become dependent upon migration in order to protect and promote their most basic human rights. While it is certainly true that much vulnerability that leads to migration is a by-product of political themselves to a positive duty to include refugees? A charitable interpretation of the rationale of states for avoiding an actual duty to include is that they are concerned with the potential high costs that would follow from the legal recognition of such moral right. The worry is that it could become too burdensome for each individual state to provide membership to all genuine refugees who make their way to its borders. By accepting a legal right to immigrate, so this interpretation goes, states would therefore bind themselves to a much more demanding legal obligation, potentially leading to disastrous consequences at the domestic level.
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While we must be careful and acknowledge that much of the concern around refugee numbers involves gross exaggeration on the part of the media in refugeereceiving countries, a reasonable version of this worry still deserves to be taken seriously. After all, small and poor states are severely constrained in their ability to include large numbers of refugees. Even territorially large and wealthy states, such as Australia, would not be able to provide membership to all those seeking entrance, since their limited natural resources might eventually place a cap on the size of their 20 The most fundamental problem with refugee camps is that they only allow refugees to secure their basic biological interests (nutrition, shelter and clothing), without giving them enough room to pursue the socio, economic and political dimensions of their life goals. As for temporary protection arrangements, the problem is the lack of knowledge of whether (and when) refugees may go back home. Because under temporary arrangements, states protect those rendered vulnerable until the conditions at home change, refugees simply lack the knowledge of how long they will safely reside in their country of asylum. And of course, such knowledge is essential if they are to make use of their moral power to form, revise and pursue their most important life plans. For a discussion of the value of taking certain things in life as fixed, see Robert E. Goodin, On Settling (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012 permissibly deported. Another (less likely) interpretation is that a country of asylum can permissibly expel refugees if their presence becomes overly costly.
The problems with either of these potential interpretations should be obvious.
Once a state includes a refugee, a new bond between the refugee and the state is created, one that should be equal to the bond between the state and those who acquired membership by birth, ancestry or who followed other legitimate channels of permanent migration. And in the same way that states are not generally permitted to banish their own citizens because they are found to be dangerous, or expel them because they unduly burden the welfare system, states should not be morally entitled to treat refugees in this way. Once a refugee is granted asylum in a recipient state, they should automatically enjoy all the benefits and burdens of citizenship.
In light of this, how else can states avoid the high costs associated with the inclusion of large numbers of vulnerable people while still treating them with equal respect? As I see it, they can do this by adopting a limitation clause that is ex-ante.
That is, before states are said to have a legal responsibility to include another refugee, some sort of cost proviso must be satisfied. Whilst it is not permissible for a recipient state to include refugees and then deport them, it is certainly permissible for the same state not to include refugees if the costs would be too high. A potential way forward here is to follow the United Nations Human Rights Convention, which specifies that human rights can be limited "for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (Art 29 (2))" There is no reason to think that the right to asylum cannot be limited in a similar way.
Let me briefly summarize what I have argued so far. D1 specifies that a new Refugee Convention must be appropriately inclusive. In order to achieve this, it must include all those individuals whose basic human rights cannot be secured without migration (without taking it too far by also including those whose claims do not actually track basic moral entitlements). As for D2, it specifies that states' legal responsibilities must accurately track their prior moral obligations. The obvious way in which states can achieve this is by both accepting a presumptive right to immigrate on the part of refugees, and a right on the part of citizens not to bear unreasonable costs when providing membership to those entitled to international protection. Let me now elaborate on D3.
The final desideratum I want to motivate here is that a new Convention must explain how immigration sits with other moral obligations on the part of states. That is, it must be sensitive to the fact that some vulnerable individuals can actually be helped in their own state of citizenship, while others can only be helped through inclusion in a new political community. This is important because those states that find themselves in a privileged position to assist non-members usually have an array of measures at their disposal. They can provide vulnerable foreigners with membership, assist them with aid, engage in humanitarian intervention, and so on.
States must, then, find ways to discern between vulnerabilities that trigger a duty of asylum and those that do not. In fact, if they fail to be more nuanced about their moral responsibilities towards vulnerable foreigners, they might both bear higher costs than what morality requires, and fail to give priority of inclusion to those who cannot be assisted in other ways.
To illustrate this point, let us imagine that we can bring the international community to accept that homosexuals do in fact constitute a 'social group,' thereby qualifying them for asylum in cases like that of Iran. Let us also assume that the rest of the current Convention remains the same. Does it then follow that all homosexuals from Iran automatically have a right to asylum? If we follow the Convention as it is framed, it will indeed be the case that once the criterion is so interpreted, Iranian homosexuals have a right not to be returned to Iran.
Yet it seems to me that whether homosexuals should be protected through migration should also depend on whether recipient states can assist them in other ways. All else being equal, if the international community could effectively assist gays in Iran without granting them asylum, then they should do so, and leave migration to those who really cannot be assisted without migrating to a second political community. As becomes clear, these three desiderata highlight the problems with the current Convention while also pointing out the need for (and the way towards) legal reform. More specifically, they show that a new Refugee Convention should commit states to including on a permanent basis those who cannot otherwise promote and protect their most basic human rights.
Part III
Showing that legal reform in the refugee protection regime is morally desirable is unfortunately not the same as showing that it is also feasible. As mentioned earlier, desirable legal reform in the area of refugee protection is virtually infeasible due to the lack of motivation on the part of refugee-receiving states. However, the fact that progress is not likely to occur now tells us nothing about whether it is likely to occur 23 Cara Nine, 'Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the Lockean Proviso', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27 (2010), p. 2. 24 Note that this differs from the doctrine of "local remedies" insofar as it specifies that assistance in the country of origin must be comparable (not simply available) to assistance in the country of asylum. And of course, the term comparable sets the bar high, which is not ideal but still preferable than relying on the idea of local remedies, which in the past have contributed to a situation in which Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Sikhs, Bosnians and Iraqi Kurds were deemed by the international community to enjoy protection in their countries of citizenship, in Andrew E. Schacknove, 'From Asylum to Containment', International Journal of Refugee Law, 5 (1993), pp. 516-533. in the future. For reasons that will become apparent later, a more desirable system of refugee protection can be rendered more feasible.
In order to understand the role that feasibility ought to play in non-ideal theorising, I follow two distinct, yet linked, conceptual understandings of feasibility.
First, I follow Gerald A. Cohen in assuming that the two crucial elements of feasibility are accessibility and stability. 25 For Cohen, when we think about the feasibility of x (such as a policy proposal or a social arrangement), we must explore whether we can bring it about, and whether we have good reasons to suppose that it is likely to be stable over time. I also follow Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith in assuming that there are two useful senses of feasibility, one binary, the other scalar.
As long as there is a way to bring x about and render it stable, it is feasible in the binary sense. But x can also be more or less feasible. 26 For these authors, only hard constraints (such as logical, nomological and biological constraints) will rule out x as infeasible. Soft constraints (such as economic, religious, cultural, motivational and institutional constraints), on the other hand, will specify the degree of its feasibility.
Given the two dimensions of feasibility (accessibility and stability) and the existence of hard and soft constraints, Gilabert and Lawford-Smith propose two tests to assess whether a proposal is indeed feasible, and if so, how feasible it is. There are three facts that significantly impact on the sort of position states are likely to adopt towards refugees. The more marginal one is the type of diplomatic relationship recipient states have previously established with the state of origin.
Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that if recipient and sender states do not enjoy amiable ties, it is politically easier for the former to grant asylum to citizens of the latter. And of course, the opposite also holds for two friendly nations, since including refugees from one's close allies may put diplomatic relations at risk.
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Another (more important) dimension affecting states' response to refugees is their heighted concern with irregular migration. Because developed states have so far implemented a moderately successful travel regime to exclude unauthorised immigrants (i.e, carrier sanctions, visa requirements, border control, etc.) they have placed themselves in a position in which they can bypass the aims of the Refugee Convention without violating its legal requirements. 29 That is, states' legitimate concern with the unauthorised entrance of immigrants into their territory provides them with the institutional apparatus to impede refugees from arriving and making a legal claim in the first place. Refugee Convention will require a shift in the way the pubic in refugee-receiving countries perceives the current refugee protection regime.
In light of the previous discussion, we might want to say that the soft constraints that require alleviation are both institutional and motivational. They are institutional because the global governance of migration is not robust enough to limit the impact of diplomatic and security considerations in a state's response towards a given refugee crisis. They are also motivational because the public in refugeereceiving countries has become increasingly more hostile towards refugees. We must therefore change the public's attitude towards those seeking asylum, as well as improve the global governance of migration and refugee protection. In order to make sense of this shift, it pays to understand what the international community already considers appropriate durable solutions to the plight of refugees. The preferred solutions are repatriation to the country of origin, provided that it is safe for the refugee to return home, and integration in the country where processing has taken place. 37 Another, less celebrated, option is re-settlement in a third country after processing has been finalized. And as it is to be expected, whether states choose any of these options often depends on political factors, the degree to which they accept their legal obligations, and what happens to be in their immediate self-interest. 38 However, I want to claim that a first important reform will require states to privilege re-settlement over integration when responding to the claims of bona fide refugees.
There are at least two reasons as to why states should move towards resettlement. The first is that re-settlement would allow the international community to better distribute numbers in accordance with each state's capacity to assist, thereby addressing public concern around distributive fairness. The second reason is that the possibility of re-settlement in a third country would arguably discourage bona fide refugees from targeting their country of choice with the help of smugglers, thereby alleviating public concern around procedural fairness. Now, I am not claiming that re-settlement would solve all the problems to do with either the current refugee protection regime or the unauthorised movement of persons. While the fact of unauthorised migration significantly overlaps with the refugee protection regime, they are distinct phenomena that require distinct political solutions. But the important difference between the current refugee protection regime 35 In Australia, research has found that community attitudes are heavily influenced by misconceptions of refugees as "illegal immigrants" who jump the UNHCR queue, in Amnesty International Australia, "Rethink Refugees," available at <http://www.rethinkrefugees.com. au/>. 36 It is possible that much of the concern around distributive and procedural fairness are motivated by xenophobia by the public in refugee-receiving countries. However, here I want to give the public in those countries the benefit of the doubt, and assume that their concerns are in fact related to the perception of the current regime as failing on fairness grounds. If turns out that citizens in refugeereceiving countries will always perceive the refugee protection regime as problematic, then at the very least, a refugee protection regime that is fairer will make xenophobic concerns more apparent and more likely to be challenged in the public domain. 37 See Loescher and Milner, 'UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees ', p. 192. 38 Ibid.
and the shift towards re-settlement that I am proposing is that by making the country of processing the same as the country of final settlement, the current regime creates a very strong incentive for both unauthorised immigrants and bona fide refugees to make their way to affluent countries with the help of smugglers. This, in turn, leads to a perverse system where smugglers exploit the vulnerability of their clients, and where the sort of protection received by a refugee can often be a function of her economic ability to contract the services of smugglers.
But if I am right that re-settlement would best conform to widely held norms of procedural and distributive fairness, how should the international community change their approach? The best way to move towards re-settlement would be for recipient states to collectively and progressively increase their quotas for refugees coming from a country of processing, while decreasing their quota for those seeking asylum directly in their territory (while I am not well placed to say how exactly the quotas should be allocated, unauthorised immigrants would arguably only be discouraged if a majority of quotas went to re-settlement). Moreover, the international community would need to expand the mandate and funding of the UNHCR, so that each state would receive clear legal guidance and material assistance in order to process those temporarily in their territory and re-settle those who have already been processed elsewhere.
39
But would states be at all moved by the reasons in favour of re-settlement?
While it is easy to dismiss proposals that require collective action on the part of the international community, there are good reasons to be optimistic here. and refugee status renders the public in some countries wholly unaware of their connection to the vulnerability of those making a claim in their territory.
Before I conclude this section, I want to mention a couple of potential worries against the reforms advocated above. The first is that, if implemented, these reforms would lead to a regime where refugees no longer choose which safe country to become members of, and so are no longer able to exercise some degree of control over their lives. The second worry is that these reforms will not necessarily increase the number of refugees who receive protection in the short term and so will not lead to an improvement over the status quo.
Let me make two brief points in response. While certainly not ideal, I believe it to be permissible to deny refugees the right to choose the country of final destination given the importance of creating a regime that fares better in terms of distributive and procedural fairness. If states stick to the current arrangement, those refugees with enough resources will in fact decide where to receive protection, but then the counterpart of that is that fewer refugees will actually receive any sort of protection in the future. As for the second point, it is indeed true that these reforms will not automatically lead to a significant increase in numbers. But recall that the discussion in this section is not about how to meet D1 or any of the other desiderata mentioned earlier, but rather about creating the conditions so that the desiderata are much more likely to be met in the future. 41 The exeption to this rule has been the on-going Colombian conflict. methodology of this essay. The concern could be expressed as follows: there is no guarantee that states and the UNHCR will in fact discharge their dynamic duties, or that the reforms advocated here will in fact lead to a more progressive system of international protection. Given these uncertainties around the likelihood of change, the concern is that this discussion is at best irrelevant and at worse confused.
It is certainly true that changes at the international level are often unpredictable (few people predicted the collapse of the USSR, or the end of Apartheid). But to conclude from this fact that we should not try to investigate the most feasible ways of bringing about change is to throw the role of agency out the window. It is certainly true that the end of Apartheid was not predictable to many agents at the time, but it is not true that no one was trying to bring it to an end. Local, national, and global structures certainly affect outcomes, but so do moral agents who mobilize strongly in favour of political change.
I am also not denying that the feasibility of legal reform is extremely difficult to measure, and I am not oblivious to the fact that there is only so much that political philosophy can do on its own. But by taking feasibility for what it is (a scalar concept that admits degrees of possibilities), I have hopefully pointed the discussion towards areas of further research, while avoiding the unhelpful conclusion that change is unlikely and therefore not worth pursuing. Indeed, in this essay I have sought to focus primarily on the fact that unless existing moral agents try and alleviate the motivational and institutional constraints currently blocking change, the refugees of tomorrow will not be able to access the protection they so badly need.
At the end of the day, sceptics would be right in claiming that there is no guarantee that we will succeed in bringing about a more desirable refugee protection regime. They would also be right in noting that the reforms I propose here might never be implemented, or if implemented, that it might not succeed in changing public attitudes. But given what is at stake for the vulnerable men and women who may soon become refugees, we certainly have very weighty reasons to try.
